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WHAT COUNTS. It is evident that the Germans are out of the Marne trap. By the simple tactics of massing great numbers of reserves against the sides of the salient, the General Staff provided a lane through which the Crown Prince's army could retire to nev positions in reasonably good order, and brilliantly covered the retreat.

The best measure, however, of the strength of the blow that Foch has dealt is to be found in the reports of the General Staff and in the explain nations of the German press. The General Staff has always been frankness itself in acknowledging minor defeats and in assessing them at their ful value. That it should have adopted a policy o wholesale concealment and mendacity at this time is proof that Foch's counter-offensive was a staggering as it was unexpected.

A characteristic comment on the German re verses is that of the Cologne Volkszeitung, which says: "What on earth matters it if we have to sacrifice some territory? Our motto is to weaken the enemy." This is all true enough, and it ap plies to the Allies as well as to the Germans, but that was not the view which the German press took of four successive German offensives beginning with that of March 21. Then every mile of territory that was taken brought the German armies so much nearer Paris or the Channel ports, and was another harbinger of victory.

Yet it is true, nevertheless, that territory in itself counts for little. The great success of the German Armies lay in the damage that was inflicted upon the British and French Armies. Up to July 1 the German General Staff claimed to have taken 191,454 unwounded prisoners, 2,476 field guns and 15,024 machine guns, aside from the vast stores of ammunition, food and supplies that fell into German hands. Of these prisoners 94,939 were English and 89,099 French, the remainder being divided, according to the Berlin Tageszeitung, among the Portuguese, Belgians and Americans.

Assuming the substantial accuracy of these figures, they represent a German success that cannot be repeated. Since the Ludendorff-Hindenburg offensive began on March 21, the United States alone has sent nearly 1,000,000 troops to France, and these troops have demonstrated their worth as soldiers in a manner no less convincing than dramatic. They will continue to pour into France at the rate of 250,000 or more a month

as long as troops are needed. Returning from a visit to France, a correspondent of the Amsterdam Handelsblatt records that "from America issues a force against which no European nation can stand. It is a gigantic force, which is developing calmly and scientifically." What is equally important, it is a force

which will be cumulative. We may be sure that the German General Staff has no illusions as to what has happened during the last two weeks. It has found in Foch a great soldier who measured up to his responsibilities and wrested the initiative from the advancing Germans. It has found in the despised Americans soldiers who can do whatever is demanded of them and who can meet the elite troops of the German Armies on equal terms. It has found that the whole military situation so far as morale is concerned has been changed overnight.

東 Y. EVENING POST

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ECONOMIC AID FOR RUSSIA

Personnel of Commission Being

Considered—Use of Czecho Slo-

vaks as a Guard Force.

[Special Dispatch to The Evening Post.]

WASHINGTON, July 11 (by A. P.).

Consideration of the personnel of the

American Commission to go to Rus-

sia is being hastened. If the type

of men now under consideration is

appointed, the Commission will be

composed in part, at least, of men

accustomed to dealing with economic

problems not only in a national but

It is still assumed here in all in-

terested quarters that, if an economic

invasion of Russia is agreed upon,

sufficient convoy of troops to pro-

tect the supplies which will be sent

to Russia will not meet with serious

Russia. With that point in mind

consideration is now being given to

the use of the Czecho-Slovak troops

in Russia in the capacity of a guard

for these supplies. It is recognized

that at present there is actual hos

tility in some parts of Russia be

tween the Czecho-Slovaks and th

Red Guards, who claim allegiance t

the Bolshevik Government. It was

the original intention that the

Czecho-Slovaks, who were equipped

by the Soviet Government at the

eastern front, should proceed

equest of France for service on t

France as quickly as possible. Their

difficulties with the Red Guar

troops while en route across Russia

are believed to be the result of com paratively trivial misunderstanding

which might have been obviated by

mediation, and it is suggested that

this form of mediation may yet re-

sult in restoring better relations,

which would permit the use of the

Czecho-Slovak troops in the economic

assistance programme now contem-

While the actual steps to be taken

by the Government for the assistance

of Russia have not yet progressed to

the point where a definite announce-

ment can be made, there are indica-

tions that the answer will not be long

in forthcoming. Both England and

France are reliably reported to have

taken a more friendly view within the

last few days toward the tentative

policy of this Government with re-

spect to Russia, and there is less in-

dication of friction among the inter-

ested Governments than at any time

plated by the Allies.

in the recent past.

objections from the authorities

an international way.

These are the things that count, and these are he standards by which Foch's great achievement is to be measured.

N. Y. STAATS ZEITUNG

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Jener beutsche frühere hauptmann von Beerfelde ieht nur die notwendigen Konfequenzen, Lenn er in einem ben Mitgliebern bes Reichstags ilberfanbten Memorabum perlangt, daß die Leiter ber beutschen Regierungen im Jahre 1914 unter Anklage gestellt werden sollen, ba fie das beutschi Bolt belogen und betrogen haben. Er berlangt bie Beraftung bes ehemaligen Reichstangers b. Bethmann-Holl. eg, und fagt bag ber Fluch biefer und aller fpateren Genentionen wegen feiger Pflichtvernachlässigung ben Reichstag treffen murbe, falls er fich nicht zu raschem Sanbeln enthließen sollte.

In feinem Interview mit bem Bertreter einer erliner Zeitung muß ber Chef bes beutschen Abmiralftabs ngeben, daß man fich in Berlin wieber fehr ftart berrechnet putte, als man annahm, daß es mit Hilfe bes unbeschränkten auchboot-Kriegs möglich sein würde, Ameritas tätige Mit-mirtung am Weltfrieg wesentlich einzuschränten wenn nicht To gut wie unmöglich ju machen. Tatfächlich haben bie beutschen Machthaber gerade bas Gegenteil erreicht. Anftatt bie ameritanifden Truppentransporte gu verzögern, ober fie gar aufzuhalten, wurden fie verdoppelt und verdreifacht. Das ift Ameritas Antwort auf bie leichtfertige Herausforberung, und babei tann Onfel Sam mit einem feiner berühmten ehemaligen Streiter gur See fagen: "Wir haben gu fampfen erft begonnen!"


Allies Gain in Fierce Battle Raging on 30-Mile Front

Grand Rozoy, the highwater mark of yesterday's advance. Crack Bavarian and Prussian divisions were hurled against the the German hold on that base. Americans along the line Fere-Sergy-Cierges (B). The Americans beat off all attacks and held their gains of the previous day. The battle along of Rheims) broke down before the allied defense.

RENCH troops are reported to have re-taken Beugneux (A) after this five-mile front continued for twenty-four hours without cessation.

Romigny (C), on the Dormans-Rheims road, is reported to have Romigny (C), on the Dormans-Rheims road, is reported to have fallen to the French. This town, just below Ville-en-Tardenois, menaces

Violent enemy attacks from both sides of St. Euphraise (southwest



Luaendorits Next Move

By Fra Copyright, 1918, by The Trig H. Simonds THREE times in four years the Ginne Association (New York Tribune)

mans have undertaken to achie a decision in the Western fiele.

Three different commanders, Moltke ti.

Association (treat to a respect to all their divisions.

Again, if Rupprecht of Bavaria reyounger, Falkenhayn and Ludendorf. have essayed to solve the great prof lem. Moltke and Ludendorff failed at resembling the Marne salient, which has the Marne, Falkenhayn at Verdun proven so disastrous for the Germans. Each of the earlier failures cost the If he attempts to push in the wedge

will be the effect of the third defeat. alike of the French army and the French | Montdidier and the Oise. people. In each case the German High could be undertaken only in the presence of a beaten foe. Three times this presumption has been punished; the will of the French army-supplemented in 1914 by the British, in 1918 by the to break the attack but to wrest the

offensive from the enemy. As it now stands, Ludendorff mus' attack again, and promptly, or else con, fess defeat in the campaign which a Germany has been educated to believil would win the war in the present surve mer and bring a victorious Germanpeace before snow came again. Anothen delay of forty days, such as has sepa rated previous efforts, would take us we into September, bring at least 300,000. more Americans to France and, what is vastly more important, allow time for at least 300,000 American troops already in France, but not yet ready for the combat, to finish their training. Automatically Foch would thus acquire another strategic reserve materially arger than that which he used with such deadly effect south of Soissons the other

day. But if Ludendorff attacks now he must attack the British, since the armies of the German Crown Prince, fighting disastrously between the Argonne and Soissons, are in no condition to underbeen exhausted, their transport disorthe recent unsuccessful battle and sub- stantly by any miscalculation of theirs. sequent considerable retreat. It is one conceivable under existing conditions.

British, however, he can employ little disconcert German commanders by relamore than twenty-five divisions of re- | tively minor operations at various points. serves, so great has been the consumption of shock troops in recent months. the Germans to deliver another great Four months ago he brought off his blow. But for many reasons he may de-Picardy success with forty divisions, fol- | sire that such a blow be delivered. lowed immediately by another forty. Ludendorff is not likely again to pos-But the British have now at least ninety | sess the initiative, as he did from March full divisions on the Western front, equal | 21 to July 15. The conditions have enin strength to at least 100 German | tirely changed and Foch is in a far difdivisions. They almost certainly out- ferent situation, having the power to number the Germans before them and | deal blow for blow with Ludendorff, the mass of their divisions are in better | meet offensive with counter offensive and condition than those of the enemy.

entailed a disproportionate loss among strated. The Allies, on the contrary, have pre- in their positions will be too strong

NEW YORK TRIBUNE

Again, if Rupprecht of Bavaria returns to the attack against Haig he must attack out of one of two salients, each Germans the initiative on the Western south of Ypres, he must present two front. It remains now to be seen what flanks to the foe and risk a counter thrust like that which won the recent We are bound to recognize, too, that Marne battle, either from Bethune or in each case the German failure has from Ypres. If he strikes for Amiens, he been the result of the same miscalcula- leaves Foch an opening flank, either betion, a false appraisal of the condition tween Albert and Arras or between

If the German thrust fails, as the Command undertook operations which | Marne thrust failed, the counter attack is bound to come, for Foch will never to back to the completely defensive strategy, and such a thrust would involve a retreat to the old Hindenburg line, or else a fatal retreat in Flanders. Americans—has been sufficient not alone If Foch has, as yet, no decisive or considerable superiority in numbers, he has at least an unquestioned equality and can afford a counter offensive whenever the German original thrust fails.

As it stands, Foch can afford to let the Germans make the first move, and, for moral if not for military reasons, they can hardly refrain from making this move. But it has become excessively risky for them to undertake a new offensive, which would eat up the last reserve divisions of shock troops and insure a counter thrust if it failed, a counter thrust bound to be exceedingly dangerous, as the Marne experience has just demonstrated.

eral offensive, such as the Germans have been indulging in. Should he undertake this and fail, the Germans would be able to pass to the offensive again with far better chances of success than they now have. As far as one can see, the waiting game, with certain clear modifications, remains the best game for the Allied commander in chief. His numbers are growing, he has mastered the new German method of attack, take an offensive. Their supplies have he has pulled down both the strength and the confidence of his foes enormousganized and their reserves consumed in ly, and he is in a position to profit in-

If the Germans try a new offensive thing to draw a great army out of a bad and fail, then may come the moment for hole skilfully and another to throw this | the general offensive of the Allies. This army into another vast offensive in a | will depend upon the extent of the Gerperiod of days. The thing was possible | man failure and the effect of the defeat in the old war of movement, when the | upon the morale of their army. But, all questions of munitions and transport | things considered, Foch seems unlikely were not so important; it is wellnigh in- to attempt a Ludendorffian stroke now. On the other hand, he can and may mul-If Ludendorff elects to strike the tiply his local operations and worry and He is sure to do this if he does not desire

wait or strike as he may choose, instead The reason for this is simple. The of waiting to be struck, as he has had to German has steadily pursued the policy | do hitherto for many months. Ludenof milking most of his divisions of the | dorff may have to strike, whether he is best men in order to create a certain | in a condition to bring off a great sucnumber of shock divisions. This has cess or not, because of political reasons, given him a wonderful striking force, but when political begin to interfere but it has had two evil consequences. It | with military reasons disasters come has materially lowered the value of all | thick and fast, as the French experience but the selected divisions, and it has | in the last war with Germany demon-

the best of his man power, since the Public attention continues to be fixed shock troops were used in the terribly | upon the fighting in what is left of the expensive first assaults in the various | Marne salient, but in the larger sense offensives. Thus after five great this phase is already completed, The efforts the German finds his shock troops | Germans have got away and are goterribly reduced in number, while the ling presently to stand at the line they balance of his forces are revealing the lave been preparing, probably at the bad effects of losing their best material. Ves.e, possibly at the Aisne. At either